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% Cumulative References for gprf06,cswf06,dcdi06,drsc06,and sged06
% This file includes no executable source code. 
% 2007.1.8;2007.1.19; last revision: 2008.5.7. 

As for prolog, for example, see [Starling 94] or [Clocksin 03].
As for classical theories of social choice, see [Arrow 63], [Sen 82], [Gaertner 01], and [Arrow 02], and 
especially for impossibility/dictatorial theorems, [Arrow 63], [Gibbard 73], and [Satterthwaite 75].
As for domain restriction see [Gaertner 01], [Blair 83], [Kalai 77], and 
especially for value restrictions, see [Sen 82], [Sen 69] and [Inada 69].
As for simple games and their stability, see [Gaertner 01], [Moulin 88], [Demange 87], [Keiding 85], [Salles 76] and [Nakamura 79].
As for effectivity functions, see [Abdou 91], [Moulin 82], and [Danilov 02].
See also [Peleg 02], [Peleg 98].

% References

[Abdou 91] Abdou, K. and Keiding, H.: Effectivity Functions in Social Choice, Kluwer Academic Press (1991)
[Arrow 63] Arrow, K.: Social Choice and Individual Values, Yale University Press (1963)
[Arrow 02] Arrow, K., Sen, A., and Suzumura, K.: Handbook of Social Choice and Walfare, Vol. 1, Elsevier (2002)
[Blair 83] Blair, D. and Muller, E.: "Essential aggregation procedure on restricted domains of preferences," 
 Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 30, pp.34-53 (1983)
[Bosserd 08] Bossert, W. and Suzumura, K.: "A characterization of consistent collective choice rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 138, p. 311-320 (2008) 
[Brams 96] Brams, S. J. and Taylor, A. D.: Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution, Cambridge Univesity Press (1996).
[Clocksin 03] Clocksin, W. F. and Mellish, C. S.: Programming in Prolog: Using the ISO Standard, 5th edition, Springer (2003)
[Danilov 02] Danilov, V. I. and Sotskov, A. I.: Social Choice Mechanisms, Springer (2002)
[Demange 87] Demange, G.: "Nonmanipulable cores," Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 5, pp. 1057-1074 (1987)
[Gaertner 01] Gaertner,W.: Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory, Cambridge University Press (2001)
[Gibbard 73] Gibbard, A.: "Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result,"
 Econometrica, Vol. 41, pp. 587-602 (1973)
[Kalai 77] Kalai, E. and Muller, E.: "Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures,"
 Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 16, pp. 457-469 (1977)
[Kaneko 75] Kaneko, M.: Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory," 
 Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 11, pp.385-393 (1975)
[Keiding 85] Keiding, H.: "Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions," 
 International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 14, No. 2: 99-101 (1985)
[Inada 69] Inada, K.: "On the simple majority decision rule,"
 Econometrica, Vol. 36, pp. 490-506 (1969)
[Moulin 82] Moulin, H. and Peleg, B: "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory,"
 Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 115-145 (1988)
[Moulin 88] Moulin, H.: Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge Univesity Press (1988)
[Muller 77] Muller, E. and Satterthwaite, M. A.: "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness,"
 Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 14, pp. 412-418 (1977)
[Nakamura 79] Nakamura, K.: "The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences," 
 International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 8: 55-61 (1979)
[Peleg 98] Peleg, B.: "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights,"
 Social Choice and Welfare 15: 67-80 (1998).
[Peleg 02] Peleg, B.: "Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees," 
 In K. J. Arrow et al. (eds,), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1, pp. 395-423. 
[Salles 75] Salles, M.: "General possibility theorem on group decision rules with Pareto-transitivity,"
 Journal of Economc Theory, Vol. 11, pp. 110-118 (1975)
[Salles 76] Salles, M.: "Characterization of transitive individual preferences for quasi-transitive collective preference under simple games,"
 International Economc Review, Vol. 17, pp. 308-318 (1976)
[Satterthwaite 75] Satterthwaite, M. A.: "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions,"
 Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 10, pp. 187-217 (1975)
[Sen 82] Sen, A.: Choice, Welfare and Measurement, MIT Press (1982)
[Sen 69] Sen, A. and Pattanaik, P. K.: "Necessary and sufficient condition for rational choice under majority decision,"
 Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 1, pp. 178-202 (1969)
[Shapley 62] Shapley, L. S.: "Simple games: an outline of the descriptive theor," 
 Behavioral Science, Vol. 67, pp. 59-66 (1962)
[Starling 94] Starling, L. and Shapiro, E.: The Art of Prolog: Advanced Programming, 2nd edition, MIT Press (1994) 
[Taylor 05] Taylor, A. D.: Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation, Cambridge University Press (2005)
[Wilson 72] Wilson, R.: "Social choice theory without the Pareto principle,"
 Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 5: pp. 478-486 (1972)

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