test_impl(gST, suh, [1, 2], full(0), _summary)
start ---------------------[date(2005/11/3), time(18:10:32)]
**** the model specification ******
game form: gST
members of society: [1, 2]
Scc:
suh(s11) = [a, e] suh(s12) = [b] suh(s32) = [b] suh(s13) = [c] suh(s23) = [c] suh(s33) = [c] suh(s22) = [d] suh(s21) = [d, e] suh(s31) = [e]
is Maskin-monotone.
is not Essentially-monotone.
preferene domain:
[agent, state, preference, difference]
[1, s11, [b, a, d, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[1, s12, [b, a, d, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[1, s13, [b, a, d, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[1, s21, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[1, s22, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[1, s23, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[1, s31, [b, d, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[1, s32, [b, d, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[1, s33, [b, d, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[2, s11, [e, d, c, a, b, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[2, s21, [e, d, c, a, b, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[2, s31, [e, d, c, a, b, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[2, s12, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[2, s22, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[2, s32, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[2, s13, [c, d, b, a, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[2, s23, [c, d, b, a, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
[2, s33, [c, d, b, a, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]]
other tests for this model
[mm, -, -, -, -, -, rvp, unan, po, -, -, neli, mlib, -, mju1, mju2, mju3, mju4]
checking the on-SCC patterns:
[s11, a][s11, e][s12, b][s13, c][s21, d][s21, e][s22, d][s23, c][s31, e][s32, b][s33, c]
For state s11,outcome=a [in, suh], rule=1
message profile is
1:m(1)
2:m(1)
agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[a, b, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[a, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[b, c, d, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
For state s11,outcome=e [in, suh], rule=1
message profile is
1:m(4)
2:m(4)
agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, b, c, d, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
For state s12,outcome=b [in, suh], rule=1
message profile is
1:m(2)
2:m(2)
agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[d, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, c, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
For state s13,outcome=c [in, suh], rule=2
message profile is
1:m(2)
2:m(3)
agents=[2],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[b, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[c, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, d, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
For state s21,outcome=d [in, suh], rule=2
message profile is
1:m(3)
2:m(2)
agents=[2],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[b, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, c, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
For state s21,outcome=e [in, suh], rule=1
message profile is
1:m(4)
2:m(4)
agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, b, c, d, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
For state s22,outcome=d [in, suh], rule=2
message profile is
1:m(3)
2:m(2)
agents=[2],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[b, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, c, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
For state s23,outcome=c [in, suh], rule=2
message profile is
1:m(2)
2:m(3)
agents=[2],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[b, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[c, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, d, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
For state s31,outcome=e [in, suh], rule=1
message profile is
1:m(4)
2:m(4)
agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, b, c, d, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
For state s32,outcome=b [in, suh], rule=1
message profile is
1:m(2)
2:m(2)
agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[d, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, c, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
For state s33,outcome=c [in, suh], rule=2
message profile is
1:m(2)
2:m(3)
agents=[2],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[b, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[c, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, d, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups:
[[1], [1, 2], [2]]
This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium.
checking the off-SCC patterns:
[s11, b][s11, c][s11, d][s11, f][s12, a][s12, c][s12, d][s12, e][s12, f][s13, a][s13, b][s13, d][s13, e][s13, f][s21, a][s21, b][s21, c][s21, f][s22, a][s22, b][s22, c][s22, e][s22, f][s23, a][s23, b][s23, d][s23, e][s23, f][s31, a][s31, b][s31, c][s31, d][s31, f][s32, a][s32, c][s32, d][s32, e][s32, f][s33, a][s33, b][s33, d][s33, e][s33, f]
end <-----------------------[date(2005/11/3), time(18:10:58)]
Summary Result
[s11, a, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s11, b, nash_no, scc_out]
[s11, c, nash_no, scc_out]
[s11, d, nash_no, scc_out]
[s11, e, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s11, f, nash_no, scc_out]
[s12, a, nash_no, scc_out]
[s12, b, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s12, c, nash_no, scc_out]
[s12, d, nash_no, scc_out]
[s12, e, nash_no, scc_out]
[s12, f, nash_no, scc_out]
[s13, a, nash_no, scc_out]
[s13, b, nash_no, scc_out]
[s13, c, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s13, d, nash_no, scc_out]
[s13, e, nash_no, scc_out]
[s13, f, nash_no, scc_out]
[s21, a, nash_no, scc_out]
[s21, b, nash_no, scc_out]
[s21, c, nash_no, scc_out]
[s21, d, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s21, e, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s21, f, nash_no, scc_out]
[s22, a, nash_no, scc_out]
[s22, b, nash_no, scc_out]
[s22, c, nash_no, scc_out]
[s22, d, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s22, e, nash_no, scc_out]
[s22, f, nash_no, scc_out]
[s23, a, nash_no, scc_out]
[s23, b, nash_no, scc_out]
[s23, c, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s23, d, nash_no, scc_out]
[s23, e, nash_no, scc_out]
[s23, f, nash_no, scc_out]
[s31, a, nash_no, scc_out]
[s31, b, nash_no, scc_out]
[s31, c, nash_no, scc_out]
[s31, d, nash_no, scc_out]
[s31, e, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s31, f, nash_no, scc_out]
[s32, a, nash_no, scc_out]
[s32, b, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s32, c, nash_no, scc_out]
[s32, d, nash_no, scc_out]
[s32, e, nash_no, scc_out]
[s32, f, nash_no, scc_out]
[s33, a, nash_no, scc_out]
[s33, b, nash_no, scc_out]
[s33, c, nash_yes, scc_in]
[s33, d, nash_no, scc_out]
[s33, e, nash_no, scc_out]
[s33, f, nash_no, scc_out]
Statistics
cputime= [1.84375, increased from, 929.109]
inferences= [1719160, increased from, 1896591310]
heapused= [189324, increased from, 1099048]
localused= [0, increased from, 3072]
globalused= [4452, increased from, 115048]
trailused= [556, increased from, 11612]
atoms= [0, increased from, 4768]
functors= [0, increased from, 2503]
predicates= [0, increased from, 2495]
modules= [0, increased from, 46]
codes= [38754, increased from, 98314]