test_impl(gST, suh, [1, 2], full(0), _summary) start ---------------------[date(2005/11/3), time(18:10:32)] **** the model specification ****** game form: gST members of society: [1, 2] Scc: suh(s11) = [a, e] suh(s12) = [b] suh(s32) = [b] suh(s13) = [c] suh(s23) = [c] suh(s33) = [c] suh(s22) = [d] suh(s21) = [d, e] suh(s31) = [e] is Maskin-monotone. is not Essentially-monotone. preferene domain: [agent, state, preference, difference] [1, s11, [b, a, d, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [1, s12, [b, a, d, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [1, s13, [b, a, d, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [1, s21, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [1, s22, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [1, s23, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [1, s31, [b, d, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [1, s32, [b, d, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [1, s33, [b, d, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [2, s11, [e, d, c, a, b, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [2, s21, [e, d, c, a, b, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [2, s31, [e, d, c, a, b, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [2, s12, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [2, s22, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [2, s32, [d, b, a, c, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [2, s13, [c, d, b, a, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [2, s23, [c, d, b, a, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] [2, s33, [c, d, b, a, e, f], [w, w, w, w, w, end]] other tests for this model [mm, -, -, -, -, -, rvp, unan, po, -, -, neli, mlib, -, mju1, mju2, mju3, mju4] checking the on-SCC patterns: [s11, a][s11, e][s12, b][s13, c][s21, d][s21, e][s22, d][s23, c][s31, e][s32, b][s33, c] For state s11,outcome=a [in, suh], rule=1 message profile is 1:m(1) 2:m(1) agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[a, b, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[a, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[b, c, d, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. For state s11,outcome=e [in, suh], rule=1 message profile is 1:m(4) 2:m(4) agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, b, c, d, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. For state s12,outcome=b [in, suh], rule=1 message profile is 1:m(2) 2:m(2) agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[d, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, c, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. For state s13,outcome=c [in, suh], rule=2 message profile is 1:m(2) 2:m(3) agents=[2],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[b, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[c, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, d, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. For state s21,outcome=d [in, suh], rule=2 message profile is 1:m(3) 2:m(2) agents=[2],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[b, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, c, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. For state s21,outcome=e [in, suh], rule=1 message profile is 1:m(4) 2:m(4) agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, b, c, d, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. For state s22,outcome=d [in, suh], rule=2 message profile is 1:m(3) 2:m(2) agents=[2],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[b, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, c, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. For state s23,outcome=c [in, suh], rule=2 message profile is 1:m(2) 2:m(3) agents=[2],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[b, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[c, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, d, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. For state s31,outcome=e [in, suh], rule=1 message profile is 1:m(4) 2:m(4) agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[f],Lcc=[e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, b, c, d, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. For state s32,outcome=b [in, suh], rule=1 message profile is 1:m(2) 2:m(2) agents=[2],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[2, 3],Czs=[d, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, c, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. For state s33,outcome=c [in, suh], rule=2 message profile is 1:m(2) 2:m(3) agents=[2],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[b, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
agents=[1],Pzs=[1, 3],Czs=[c, f],Lcc=[c, e, f]
agents=[1, 2],Pzs=[1, 2, 3],Czs=[a, d, e, f],Lcc=[a, b, c, d, e, f]
best response groups: [[1], [1, 2], [2]] This action profile is a strong Nash equilibrium. checking the off-SCC patterns: [s11, b][s11, c][s11, d][s11, f][s12, a][s12, c][s12, d][s12, e][s12, f][s13, a][s13, b][s13, d][s13, e][s13, f][s21, a][s21, b][s21, c][s21, f][s22, a][s22, b][s22, c][s22, e][s22, f][s23, a][s23, b][s23, d][s23, e][s23, f][s31, a][s31, b][s31, c][s31, d][s31, f][s32, a][s32, c][s32, d][s32, e][s32, f][s33, a][s33, b][s33, d][s33, e][s33, f] end <-----------------------[date(2005/11/3), time(18:10:58)] Summary Result [s11, a, nash_yes, scc_in] [s11, b, nash_no, scc_out] [s11, c, nash_no, scc_out] [s11, d, nash_no, scc_out] [s11, e, nash_yes, scc_in] [s11, f, nash_no, scc_out] [s12, a, nash_no, scc_out] [s12, b, nash_yes, scc_in] [s12, c, nash_no, scc_out] [s12, d, nash_no, scc_out] [s12, e, nash_no, scc_out] [s12, f, nash_no, scc_out] [s13, a, nash_no, scc_out] [s13, b, nash_no, scc_out] [s13, c, nash_yes, scc_in] [s13, d, nash_no, scc_out] [s13, e, nash_no, scc_out] [s13, f, nash_no, scc_out] [s21, a, nash_no, scc_out] [s21, b, nash_no, scc_out] [s21, c, nash_no, scc_out] [s21, d, nash_yes, scc_in] [s21, e, nash_yes, scc_in] [s21, f, nash_no, scc_out] [s22, a, nash_no, scc_out] [s22, b, nash_no, scc_out] [s22, c, nash_no, scc_out] [s22, d, nash_yes, scc_in] [s22, e, nash_no, scc_out] [s22, f, nash_no, scc_out] [s23, a, nash_no, scc_out] [s23, b, nash_no, scc_out] [s23, c, nash_yes, scc_in] [s23, d, nash_no, scc_out] [s23, e, nash_no, scc_out] [s23, f, nash_no, scc_out] [s31, a, nash_no, scc_out] [s31, b, nash_no, scc_out] [s31, c, nash_no, scc_out] [s31, d, nash_no, scc_out] [s31, e, nash_yes, scc_in] [s31, f, nash_no, scc_out] [s32, a, nash_no, scc_out] [s32, b, nash_yes, scc_in] [s32, c, nash_no, scc_out] [s32, d, nash_no, scc_out] [s32, e, nash_no, scc_out] [s32, f, nash_no, scc_out] [s33, a, nash_no, scc_out] [s33, b, nash_no, scc_out] [s33, c, nash_yes, scc_in] [s33, d, nash_no, scc_out] [s33, e, nash_no, scc_out] [s33, f, nash_no, scc_out] Statistics cputime= [1.84375, increased from, 929.109] inferences= [1719160, increased from, 1896591310] heapused= [189324, increased from, 1099048] localused= [0, increased from, 3072] globalused= [4452, increased from, 115048] trailused= [556, increased from, 11612] atoms= [0, increased from, 4768] functors= [0, increased from, 2503] predicates= [0, increased from, 2495] modules= [0, increased from, 46] codes= [38754, increased from, 98314]